Contributor: How the Trump administration can build on what’s working in the war on drugs

The Trump administration reportedly directed the Department of Defense recently to begin to use military force against a slew of drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. As a number of national security scholars and subject matter experts have argued, further militarization, particularly unilaterally, will not win the war on drugs. The White House should consider staying the course on its current diplomatic efforts while exploring demand-side options for curtailing the fentanyl crisis.

Despite their overheated rhetoric, President Trump and Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum have worked to resume cooperation on combating drug smuggling and cartel violence. The Mexican government has extradited two waves of incarcerated cartel associates to the United States, first in February and then again in August. Additionally, Sheinbaum previously ordered Mexican National Guard troops to the U.S.-Mexico border and is collaborating with the U.S. on drone surveillance. Finally, the U.S. Army Special Forces 7th Group has resumed its train-and-assist mission with the Mexican Marines.

These initiatives, compared with the prospect of unilateral military force, come at considerably less diplomatic cost. If the White House wants to remain proactive on the cartel issue within Latin America, working through the Mexican government, however imperfect a solution, remains the best of many bad options.

Sheinbaum has repeatedly warned that U.S. use of unilateral military force would constitute a red line for the Mexican government. The notion of sovereignty is a particularly sensitive issue in Mexico, given the country’s complex history with its northern neighbor. While skeptics in the U.S. may feel inclined to dismiss such protests, they do so at their peril, for they risk undermining the very bilateral relationship needed to mitigate the cartel issue.

Efforts like those the U.S. military could undertake unilaterally have been tried before. Previous Mexican administrations prosecuted their own full-scale war on drugs, killing or capturing scores of cartel leaders and thousands of the rank and file. Proponents of U.S. unilateral action have failed to articulate how they foresee such efforts leading to strategic success where the Mexican government’s efforts have not. Thus, the use of U.S. military action inside Mexico would pose significant diplomatic risk for little strategic gain.

Interdiction efforts, even if tactically successful and bilaterally conducted, need to be assessed soberly, for the history of the war on drugs suggests that supply-side strategies in isolation are ineffective over the long haul. Eradicating sources of illicit narcotics to limit their consumption and overdose mortality has been, at best, a game of proverbial whack-a-mole.

Even for the best-case example cited by supporters of further intervention, that of Colombia, a closer examination reveals less than encouraging results. Despite decades of economic assistance and direct coordination under the auspices of “Plan Colombia,” it failed to stem the flow of cocaine into the United States.

The supply-side dynamic is even more daunting for a synthetic narcotic such as fentanyl. Being lab-made, fentanyl is cheaper to produce, store and ship than traditional agriculturally derived drugs. While attacking the literal roots of poppy, marijuana or coca production were often fleeting endeavors, which incurred significant ecological costs, agricultural eradication of these drugs was nevertheless an option available to policymakers. Such is not the case with fentanyl, as it can be made at varying scales of production, often indoors and in densely populated areas, and therefore free from traditional modes of detection.

Given these differences in production methods, where interdiction could achieve measured success is in areas that are less diplomatically sensitive, such as at the U.S.-Mexico border and at sea. Again, however, the history of the drug war does not present an encouraging picture for interdiction as a panacea.

Given these challenges and the historic difficulties of supply-side interdiction and targeting cartel networks, the White House should explore policy options to reduce demand and further efforts at harm reduction. Those are the most promising paths to save lives in the U.S. On this front, there are early encouraging signs. According to U.S. government statistics, overdose deaths have dropped more than 25% nationwide. The exact causal elements of said reduction are unclear; however, some states and localities report success in harm reduction programs, including the increased availability of the lifesaving medication Narcan. Generational trends are also encouraging, with Gen Z displaying an even greater decrease in opioid-related overdoses.

Whether this decline is attributable to an increase in interdiction or the success of harm reduction, the trend is encouraging, especially given that proponents of military action often argue that all other policy options have been exhausted. Considering these domestic trends, it would be foolish to embark on a unilateral military campaign. If overdose deaths are down and Mexican cooperation is up, the wisest course of action for the Trump administration would be to stay its current course lest it undo the progress it has made.

Brandan P. Buck, a foreign policy research fellow at the Cato Institute, is a historian of domestic opposition to U.S. foreign policy and former intelligence analyst who worked in counterterrorism.